ideal. In Afghanistan, the non-Russian parts of the USSR, and the eight "captive" nations of Eastern Europe, Communism was an alien force imposed by foreign arms on unwilling people.
Despite these central differences between Communist regimes, however, certain common themes appear in accounts of the final years of the formerly Communist nations (except perhaps Ethiopia). The most common theme, in both scholarly and popular accounts, is the growing yearning for democracy and human rights, as well as the desire for higher standards of living. 6 While these various features are intertwined in somewhat different ways in the several nations, they do not themselves form an adequate explanation in any nation. Thus while nationalism as well as yearning for democracy produced an uprising in Hungary (1956) , reform in Czechoslovakia (1968) , and repeated unrest in Poland (1956 Poland ( , 1970 Poland ( , 1976 Poland ( , 1980 , none of these succeeded and other Eastern European Communist governments confronted no such unrest.
7 During this time, there is remarkably little evidence of widespread popular yearning for either democracy or human rights within the Soviet bloc. Black markets throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR focusing on blue jeans and rock-n-roll hardly supply such evidence. 8 Such dissatisfaction
as there was came from the growing realization among workers that their efforts were accomplishing little and earning them less. This realization was expressed in the oft-repeated joke 6 DALOS, supra note 5; MEYER, supra note 5; PLESHAKOV, supra note 5; SAROTTE, supra note 5; SEBESTYEN, supra note 5; REV. 17 (1995) . For a major departure from this pattern, see KOTKIN & GROSS, supra note 5 (arguing that the collapse arose from an "implosion" within the Communist establishment that had little or nothing to do with the dramatic events outside the establishment that are usually identified as the "causes" of the collapse). 7 TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC LANTERN (1990) . 8 See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 6, [24] [25] 38, [41] [42] (discussing the prevalence of a "shadow economy"-a black market-in all Communist societies).
among workers that they had a deal with the government: "We pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us."
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Only after the dissolution of Communism was well underway did popular unrest begin to threaten the system. Even in Poland, persistent attempts to create space for open opposition to the Communist government largely failed until near the end of the system. Attempts to create "civil society," primarily through the creation of "Helsinki watch groups," are simply not enough to explain why Communism so suddenly collapsed. 10 Such an explanation seems to leave at least one aspect of the collapse missing-why then? The Communist governments had functioned for decades without serious internal or external challenge, and there was no obvious reason why they couldn't continue along the same path for decades more. Something had to crystallize the sentiment that the regimes not only had to go but could be overthrown.
In many of these countries, the something more turned out to be the environment. Communism had a dismal record on the environment. 11 By 1989, sulfurous skies were killing people across the Soviet bloc. Single Russian factories were producing more pollution than all of Scandinavia. 12 Immediately after the end of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation classified onesixth of its territory as uninhabitable because of pollution-yet the inhabitants had nowhere to go. 13 Rivers were poisoned beyond anything found in western countries, 14 while Lake Baikal 9 See, e.g., MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE 216 (1993) . I heard this joke repeatedly when I lived for a year in the People's Republic of China before the market reforms took hold there, and I also heard it on visits to several Communist countries in Europe. 10 See, e.g., Michael Bernhard, Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East-Central Europe, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 307 (1993) . 11 FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 9; BARBARA JANCAR, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION excesses in the west. 21 This introduces a fourth factor-structural features rooted in Marxist ideology and the conspiratorial nature of Communism's rise to power-that are perhaps the most important. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" brooked no countervailing power centers. 22 The
Communist obsession with secrecy often kept problems hidden from both the public and the central authorities until catastrophe made the problem obvious to all. 23 Fifth, the determination to keep environmental problems secret was reinforced by the belief that such problems could not arise under Communism, which, after all, represented the most progressive ordering of society and the economy; to admit to environmental failings was to admit that Communism had failed in at least one important respect. 24 Finally, there was the importance of "fulfilling the plan." Success and promotion for officials-and all major economic decisions were made by officialscame only from fulfilling the plan, which generally was measured solely through quantitative achievements, resulting in pervasive poor quality production. Communism itself may have looked like an old building in 1986, but it also looked like a sturdily built building that would stand a long time. With the environment in such a problematic state, and structural and ideological problems precluding effective responses within a Communist system, it would have been remarkable if environmental problems did not play a major role in bringing down the system. In fact, a major environmental disaster on such a scale and in such a place that it could not be hidden precipitated a crippling crisis in the USSR itself when it became clear that the government could not cope. The crisis discredited the government and emboldened its critics so much that it could not survive. The structure of dissent in the Soviet bloc, such as it was, further ensured that environmental concerns would be central to the rhetoric, if not perhaps the real reasons, for the toppling of the Communist governments.
Moderately large "green" movements with a modest degree of independence had been tolerated as a sort of window dressing for the official power structure. These groups, rather than the "forums" created to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords or to agitate for democracy or human rights, formed the organizational core for the toppling of the Communist governments.
The toppling of some governments after an environmental crisis in turn weakened neighboring Communist governments, again often with environmental groups leading the way. Yet the role of the environment (and more pointedly, of environmentalism) in bringing Communism to an end in Europe has largely escaped notice.
II. CHERNOBYL OPENS A CRACK IN THE EDIFICE
The old building created by the Communist system crumbled in most of the nations included within its walls in the five years following the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Dissidence only barely survived in the USSR before the Chernobyl nuclear accident. 29 The "Helsinki Watch" and other over dissident groups were repressed; an officially sponsored "peace movement" was kept under tight party control despite growing public unhappiness over the Afghanistan adventure.
The Soviet and party authorities allowed a modest degree of independence only for the environmentalist movement. 30 There were several reasons for relative tolerance of the "Greens." 31 First, most "Greens" were not ideological enemies of Marxism; many considered capitalism as necessarily worse for the environment than socialism or communism. Second, the Greens provided important information that would not otherwise reach the "Center" given the increasingly pervasive misinformation being passed up by the apparatchiki. Third, the "Greens" provided proof of "Soviet democracy" in action. Finally, "Greens" tended to be disaffected individuals who were isolated in temperament and thought from the mass of the people and thus could not present a real challenge to the regime. The last reason was perhaps the most important.
The USSR had had several nuclear accidents before Chernobyl, but they were in remote areas during periods of tight control of information and remained nothing more than unverified rumor for most people in the country. 32 In April 1986, however, the Chernobyl accident occurred in the middle of large populations and near the power centers of the USSR. State control, more- Millions lived with the areas subject to irradiation, which included the largest cities in Belarus (Minsk) (about 160 km, 100 mi., away) and Ukraine (Kiyev-only 110 km., 68 mi., away).
Costs of food within the region rose sharply because radiation rendered food grown nearby unsafe. The government actually kept agriculture in those regions in production, but put the resulting food into long-term storage because it was too radioactive to be consumed. Eventually, the government would mix stored meat from the region with safe meat from elsewhere at a ratio of 1:10 to make sausages and then would disperse the sausages around the country to prevent an "undesirable accumulation" of radioactivity in particular populations. the extent of the disaster, only serving to further discredit the regime as Western broadcasts and refugees from the area spread the word.
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In the wake of these failings, large-scale public criticism of the Soviet state and its policies emerged for the first time, within the Supreme Soviet and on the street. 44 The increasing flow information finally forced the government to admit that its "first-generation" of nuclear power reactors did not meet "modern safety standards," causing the Ministry of Atomic Power to order such reactors to be run at 70% of capacity. 45 Eventually, the Russian Academy of Sciences recommended that these reactors be shut down. The government's evident failures empowered its critics to speak out about other ecological disasters in the USSR. This movement spread rapidly in the non-Russian republics where it mingled with re-emergent nationalisms. 46 The relatively tolerated environmental groups provided cover for those who might actually have been more interested in nationalism or other matters. Criticism grew more slowly in Russia itself, perhaps because the ethnic Russians were responsible for the errors of industrialization in the USSR.
The reaction was particularly intense in Belarus and Ukraine, two Soviet republics in which the sense of separate nationhood had been most thoroughly repressed before Chernobyl. 47 An independence group, Rukh, was formed in Ukraine within weeks of Chernobyl. As Sergei Oda- reached Belarus, the strikers used their time on television to discuss Chernobyl and to demand the resignation of the President and Supreme Soviet of the USSR rather than the economic issues featured elsewhere in the Union. 50 The discrediting of the Soviet regime continued after the end of the Communist regime when its records, on Chernobyl and other ecological disasters, became public.
III. THE GABČIKOVO-NAGYMAROS DAM: WALLS CRUMBLE FROM THE EDIFICE
Neither the Soviet government nor the long-troubled Polish government was the first Communist regime to fall. That honor goes to the Communist government in Hungary, perhaps best symbolized by the decision to tear down the barbed wire along the Austrian border on May 2, broad program of reform that led to the regime's collapse. 53 Hungary technically was then ruled by a "coalition" of allied parties under the "leadership" of the Socialist Workers (Communist)
Party, but the "allied" parties had never taken an independent line. Just before these events, the government allowed the emergence of Fidesz (the Alliance of Young Democrats) as an open opposition party, to be followed by several other opposition parties. 54 The significance of these events was obscured because long-drawn-out "discussions" about electoral reform delayed the first free election until 1990, after Solidarnosc had taken power in Poland. 55 These Hungarian developments, moreover, were overshadowed by the dramatic events then playing out in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Given the scant attention given these events, one is not surprised that few noticed that the Communist government in Hungary fell because of certain dams.
The Danube River is the second longest in Europe (after the Volga). After dropping significantly across southern Germany and Austria, it flattens out as it forms the border between Hungary and Slovakia and spreads into three main channels that flow eastward across a broad flood plain, creating a network of islands and wetlands. These channels reunite at the Great Bend of the Danube after which it turns south to bisect Hungary. After falling 50 meters per 100 kilometers in Austria, the river falls only 50 meters across its 417 km. (260 mi.) length in Hungary. 56 This is inadequate to support hydroelectric generation unless one or more large dams were built to create an artificial fall. The Communist governments in Czechoslovakia and Hungary discussed such a project for 25 years before signing a treaty in 1977 to construct a series of dams, with the costs and the resulting electricity to be shared equally. 57 Other claimed benefits included flood control, improved navigation, storage of fresh water for use during dry periods, enhanced recreational opportunities, and the ability to extract sand and gravel from the siltation of the reservoirs. 58 The plan called for construction of a dam at Dunakiliti in Hungary to "capture" the Danube. Virtually the entire flow of the Danube and several of its tributaries would then be diverted through a 17.5 km. (11 mi.) long elevated canal to a second dam and a 720 megawatt power plant at Gabčikovo in Slovakia. The canal, to lie atop mounded earth rising as much as 18 m. (65 ft.) over the landscape, was to be lined with asphalt and plastic to prevent seepage. As a result, the flow of water in the natural channel would decline from 2,000 m 3 /sec. to less than 1 m 3 /sec. A third dam was to be built about 100 km. (62 mi.) downstream from Gabčikovo at Nagymaros in Hungary, to generate another 158 megawatts while directing the flow back to the natural channel of the river. The plan was for most of the flow of the river to be stored in a large reservoir (covering 60 km 2 -24 mi 2 ) at Dunakiliti, to be released to support peak power generation at Gabčikovo. Water was to be released twice a day to flush the canal, allow the turbines at Gabčikovo to generate electricity when it was most needed, and to return to the river at Nagymaros in "12-ft. (4 m.) tidal waves."
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The Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project was never popular in Hungary, largely because of serious ecological and social ills that the project was expected to produce in Hungary. 60 Unpopularity rose when the Hungarian government proved unable to finance its share of the project and turned to Austria to provide the financing in exchange for the entire Hungarian share of the elec- and the drying of croplands and forests. Add to these, fears of pollution and disease from leaching from the asphalt that would line the canals and reservoirs and an overall 25% decline of the fish population (and perhaps a 90% drop in the commercial fish harvest). Such problems were projected to affect about 2,000,000 people in Hungary (out of a population of 10,000,000). These problems would also affect about 1,000,000 people in Slovakia (out of a population of 4,000,000 No particular environmental crisis played a role in the collapse of the German Democratic
Republic, but, as in Hungary, the Greens dominated the opposition and exploited popular discontent to topple the government. The Greens were unable to build a new regime, so their successes against the Communists yielded a united and decidedly un-Green Germany. The East German pacifist and environmental groups were made up mostly of clergy and intellectuals. Because the Communists had worked hard to make such people marginal in society, they apparently did not fear that they could mobilize wide support should they escape control. When the government failed to prevent the flight of large numbers of people through the Hungarian border and the West German embassy in Prague, 84 it lost control of the pacifist and green movements at home.
Having had years of organizing experience, they now turned those skills against the government, leading demonstrations against the government (particularly in Leipzig). They founded a new organization (Neues Forum-the "New Forum"), which succeeded in crippling the government but was reluctant to replace the Communist regime. Bringing down Communism in Albania took more time and did not immediately flow from the leadership of Green groups, but those emerged very early in the process. Albania's Communists always employed one of the most repressive regimes in Europe and held on for a full year after most of the European Communist governments had fallen. Finally, on November 28, 1990, anti-Communist riots broke out in Elbasan, in southern Albania. Elbasan as the site of the riots was not fortuitous. It was the most heavily polluted industrial center in Albania, with heavy air and water pollution. One estimate is that as much of 10% of the cement produced in the town was released into the air. 98 Plants producing chrome, coke, nickel, and steel in the city also polluted its land, air, and water. The Elbasan riots led, two weeks later, to the formation of two independent parties-the Democratic Party (dedicated initially to protecting peasants' interests, but quickly broadening out to represent intellectuals and industrial workers) and the Albanian Ecological Party (founded in Elbasan and dedicated to addressing a growing ecological crisis).
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This led to free elections in March of 1991, which brought a coalition of the Communists and the Democrats to power. 100 The Albanian Ecology Party remained in opposition, charging that the Communists had "ruined the environment here more than in any other East European country." 101 The coalition government proved fragile, collapsing in December 1991, leading to rampant lawlessness and further environmental degradation. 102 The inability of the Albanian Ecological Party to make an electoral impact led to the creation of an environmental activist group,
Perla.
103 Perla, however, made only a small impact when Albania's attention was diverted to the fights of compatriots for autonomy in Serbia (Kosovo) and Macedonia.
V. WALLS TUMBLE FOR OTHER REASONS
In Europe, only in Romania and Yugoslavia was blood shed in the overthrow of Communism. And only there did environmental concerns seem wholly irrelevant to that overthrow. Each followed its own somewhat different course.
In Romania, the transition from Communism came about largely through an intraparty coup against the Ceauşescu regime that once started could not be stopped short of toppling of the Communists, in form if not in fact. 104 The National Salvation Front, which was set up after the Ceauşescus were summarily executed, was, in fact, dominated by apparatchiki of the old regime. 105 Only gradually and fitfully did the government evolve towards democracy. 106 Even Romania, however, was deeply influenced by the events in neighboring states, in nearly all which the changes were driven by environmental concerns to varying degrees.
Somewhat similarly, the Communist Party in the former Yugoslavia dissolved in power struggles over the succession to long-time dictator Josip Tito. 107 The leaders of the constituent republics sought to exploit resurgent nationalism in order to strengthen and secure their positions. The Yugoslav Socialist Federation ended in a violent explosion of nationalism seemingly with connection with environmental concerns.
Outside of Europe, the situation in Ethiopia was much like Romania and Yugoslavia-a violent fall, this time driven by years of civil and foreign war that seemed to have little to do with environmental concerns. 108 The failure of the Communist regime in Afghanistan seems to have resulted from pure nationalism, expressed religiously. 109 These seemingly remote and disparate failures of Communism are not without significance to our main story. In particular, the Soviet failure in the Afghan war, coming only 3 years after Chernobyl, contributed significantly to the corrosion of public support for the Soviet government, particularly among the military, contributing to the collapse of that government.
VI. WHY DID SO MUCH OF THE EDIFICE COLLAPSE?
Environmental concerns certainly played a pivotal role in corroding and collapsing Communism, but they hardly explain everything about the collapse. I do not suggest a simple, deterministic theory of environmental crises bringing down Communist (or perhaps other) authoritarian governments. There was a highly generalized disaffection with the regime, whether derived from frustrated consumerism, resurgent nationalism, or a real yearning for democracy and human rights. 110 The willingness of the Red Army to turn against the Soviet regime in a failed coup after the disastrous war in Afghanistan also contributed to the fall. And the completely opposite roadmaps for reform followed in China and in the USSR and Eastern Europe perhaps contributed to the fall. None of this provides a fully satisfactory explanation, however. Inept governments have survived for decades or centuries until some precipitating event causes their demise. In the end much depends on how the mass of the people interpret the crisis-an interpretation that the government itself can manipulate so long as it retains effective control over the flow of information. Much also depends on the personality of leadership. Mikhail Gorbachev, no less than Louis 108 BAHRU ZEWDE, A HISTORY OF MODERN ETHIOPIA, 1855 (2001 XVI or Nikolai II, bears a heavy responsibility for the collapse of his system of government.
Gorbachev was the first person to hold supreme power in the USSR since Lenin who had had a legal education, and he surrounded himself with others with legal educations (most of whom, like Gorbachev, had not actually worked as lawyers). So little attention has been to this feature that studies have been written about Gorbachev without mention of his legal training and legalistic approach to crises. 111 The impact of the legalistic mindset (the lawyer's way of constructing reality, as it were) on the unraveling of these regimes would make an interesting case study, 112 if only because the most conspicuous exception to the dissolution of Communist Party control (China) is the least legalistic culture of the lot.
As bad as environmental concerns have been (and continue to be) in Communist countries, people then and now seem able to tolerate an enormous amount of environment degradation even to the point of rising death rates so long as the degradation seems routine and highly generalized, dismissing it as part of the "natural background" within which humans work out their lives.
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The collapse of Communist regimes shows, however, that when a dramatic event (a nuclear accident, a potentially disastrous dam) attributable to the government arises within this pattern of generalized degradation, it can galvanize hitherto diffused discontent against the government, so long as there is some minimal flow of information and some organized groups outside the effective control of the government. Shocks, rather than stresses, are the primary triggers of change.
Governments can survive these challenges if the system is resilient. In other words, if the system provides mechanisms for airing and responding to grievances, the more mechanisms the better. is fully committed to a capitalist economy-without the checks and balances, ineffective as they sometimes are, that are built into democratic capitalist systems. The resulting rampant corruption is suggestive of the "robber barons" who dominated American capitalism a century earlier.
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Environmental problems are among the most severe in the world and continue, as of this writing to worsen. This includes megaprojects like the Three Gorges Dam as well as rampant air and water pollution, spreading desertification, and threatened resource exhaustion.
The Three Gorges Dam itself was built, and caused even more severe environmental problems than were predicted in 1992. 123 The failure to clean-up factories, mines, and towns flooded in the reservoir have made the reservoir into a cesspool of pollution rather than store of usable fresh water. 124 Diseases like schistosomiasis are spreading as the waters rise in the reservoir.
Rather than preventing downstream flooding, the impact of the dam has degraded the channel below the dam creating risks of even more serious flooding than before. 126 Major historical and cultural assets have been flooded out with limited efforts to relocate them; 127 in one instance, the local authorities responded to the flooding of historical artifacts by creating an "underwater museum" accessible by escalator. 128 Endangered species are threatened with extinction because of the dam. 129 Reports are circulating that other, smaller reservoirs may have triggered earthquakes, 130 which, if true, create truly major worries about the Three Gorges project. Already nearly 1.3 million people have had to be relocated to make room for the dam and its reservoir according to official figures, 131 and as many as 4 million more might have to be relocated because the water logging from the reservoir is causing the collapse of lands above the reservoir into its already polluted waters. 132 The situation of the displaced people has been aptly described as "abysmal." 133 Nor are the benefits of the dam all that clear. While the dam unquestionably generates vast amounts of electricity, it does not resolve country's energy problems given the speed with which demand for energy is growing in China. 134 What's more, questions are being raised about the quality of construction in the dam: Its face exhibited cracks even before construction was complete, and while these have been repaired, one cannot help but wonder about the reliability of the structure. 135 Both the shoddy construction and the poorly implemented relocation of former inhabitants of the region resulted in part from the pervasive corruption now found in China. 136 In addition to the problems created by the Three Gorges project, China continues to destroy its environment to feed the ravenous appetite of its industries, particularly in the face of the global economic crisis. 137 The air in many Chinese cities is simply poisonous. 138 The air is so bad that breathing inside buildings in China is the greatest threat to public health. 139 China actually succeeded in cleaning the air in Beijing for the Olympic Games in August 2008, only to see the air deteriorate after the games. 140 This had the effect of making it clear, however, that the pollution was not simply part of the "background noise" of life, forcing the government to invest in improving air quality, at least in Beijing. 141 Just how this will play out over the country as a whole remains to be seen, and even in Beijing air quality remains poor. 142 Meanwhile many other environmental problems remain largely unaddressed.
Attractive historic buildings are torn down with little or no compensation to the owners in order to clear land for highly polluting factories or expensive modern shops and houses. 143 The north of China faces severe water shortages caused by pollution and overuse. 144 The investing of vast sums in attempting to import water from a thousand kilometers or more away in central
China has foundered on strong public resistance to the project prompted by ecological concerns causing multi-year delays in the project 145 -unlike the Three Gorges project where resistance had no impact. 146 Elsewhere, entire public water supply systems have had to shut down in recent years because of massive pollution of the source waters. 147 China has become the major contributor of greenhouse gases to climate disruption and will reap its reward from impending "mega-disasters." 148 In 2008, the government completely overhauled the structure of its environmental regulatory agencies, ostensibly to better address the increasingly serious environmental problems. 149 Careful analysis, however, suggests that this reform still didn't address the fundamental structural problems that have thus far ensured the environmental regulation has largely been ineffective. 150 That reports of severe environmental problems in China circulate despite efforts of the government to suppress them perhaps suggests that the government is losing control of the flow of information. Whether other conditions will combine with that information to undermine the government remains to be seen. The fact is that environmental concerns (whether conceived narrowly in terms of pollution and ecological disruption or broadly in terms of the destruction of the built environment as well as the natural environment) are one of the driving forces behind the steadily rising incidence of "mass incidents"-anything from a modest protest to strikes to antigovernment riots-that has the government so alarmed. 151 The government itself estimated there spect a broad range of freedoms, including the right to organize political parties to compete with the Communist Party of China. 157 Charter 08 gained some 10,000 signatures online before the government banned its mention within China.
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Activists have expressed hope that recent proposals to liberalize the oversight of NGOs working on AIDS would be extended to all NGOs. 159 Instead the government increasingly has cracked down all forms of dissent, including simple petitioners who surfaced because of unfulfilled promises of opportunities for free expression at the Beijing Olympics. 160 These would-be protesters were given relatively short sentences, 161 but the organizers of Charter 08 faced a more uncertain future. At least the future remains uncertain for most of the authors of Charter 08.
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For Liu Xiaobo, perhaps the leading organizer of the Charter 08 movement, however, the future is settled. He was held without trial for more than a year, 163 and then, in a closed trial that lasted less than three hours, was sentenced to 11 years in prison on December 25, 2009. 164 Others in-volved in Charter 08 have suffered as well, although not so dramatically. 165 The message is clear to those who would criticize the government too aggressively. 166 That message was perhaps expressed even more clearly by the doubling of total arrests for "endangering state security" between 2007 (742 arrests) and 2008 (1,712 arrests). 167 Notwithstanding the controls on environmental NGOs in the China, they have managed, often through the Internet or cell-phone texting, to coordinate resistance to activities that impose particularly egregious insults on the environment. 168 There is even an emerging informal, yet somewhat effective, movement concerned about global climate disruption. 169 Several of these organizations are focused precisely on the problems created by the Three Gorges Dam. 170 The government continues to seek to control or suppress all organizations involved in active protests or other mass incidents, and particularly to control their access to funds. 171 The government har-
